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THE RECONCILIATION IN 
ARGENTINA: IS IT COMPLETE? 
Tina R. Niedzwiecki 
The people refer to it as "the Dirty War." 
The Argentines thought that the "temporary" 
military government that took over in 1976 was 
rescuing them from the poorly-led Isabel Peron 
government. (Isabel was president Juan Peron's 
third wife and vice-president prior to his death.) 
Isabel forced the country into economic tur-
moil through her mismanagement. To add to 
the country's economic decay, guerrilla move-
ments became active and used violence to show 
their presence. The military government tried 
to eradicate traces of Isabel and any sense of dis-
order caused by guerrilla groups through rad-
ical and extreme measures. 
The "Dirty War" began in 1975 even before 
this military coup and would last for the next 
seven years, during which time some of the 
Argentine people would be subjected to 
unimaginable torture which often led to death, 
all at the hands of the Argentine military. 
Depending on the source, as few as ten thou-
sand and as many as thirty thousand people 
died or disappeared at the hands of this military 
government. The military hoped to restructure 
society and rid it of all "problems." This meant 
excluding all leftist groups from political par-
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ticipation and, in an extreme case, banning the 
Peronist party, which still supported the views 
of the late president. In order to fully imple-
ment its plan, the military found it necessary 
to eliminate certain factors from society. These 
"factors" were people, who were taken and 
killed or tortured because the military found 
that their respective political beliefs were 
threatening to its plan for society. 
In 1983 the rule of terror finally came to 
an end when Raul Alfonsfn of the Radical Party 
was democratically elected with over fifty per-
cent of the vote. The transition to democracy 
had begun. One of the first issues the new leader 
addressed was the enormous disrespect for basic 
human rights under the military regime. He 
dealt with the issue by establishing La Comision 
Nacional sobre Ia Desaparicion de Personas (the 
National Commission on the Disappearance of 
People). The group's purpose was to investigate 
the human rights violations, the result of which 
was the Nunca Mas (Never Again) report which 
explained in detail its findings. 
Democracy continued with the next tran-
sition of power to the freely elected President 
Carlos Menem. At the time of this writing, 
Menem is still president, and the violent mili-
tary regime of the not -very-distant past seems 
a mere faded memory. The Argentine people 
perhaps have suffered enough and want simply 
to forget, but something will not let them. 
In this paper, I will discuss and evaluate the 
democratic transition in detail with a special 
focus on the human rights violations of the mil-
itary regime and, consequently, the reconcilia-
tion which Argentine society faced. I will also 
examine the different social and political groups 
involved in the process of democratization and 
reconciliation. Finally, I will analyze the success 
of the reconciliation under both the Alfonsfn and 
Menem administrations respectively. 
The Coup of 1976 
On July 1, 197 4, President Juan Peron died 
while serving as Argentina's president for the 
second time. Peron was a man who, for gener-
ations, served as the figurehead of the political 
party that bears his name and continues on 
with great strength in Argentine politics. Upon 
his death, his vice-president took office. The 
new president was now the late president's wife, 
Isabel. Under her rule, Argentina deteriorated 
economically, socially and politically. The mil-
itary took it upon itself to relieve the situation 
by intervening. This regime sought to drasti-
cally change society and was not afraid to use 
violence to accomplish these goals. 
The overthrow was orchestrated by one 
General Jorge Rafael Videla. He and his regime 
took on two huge responsibilities. The first was 
to quell recent uprisings by such violent guer-
rilla groups as the Montoneros. This radical 
and often violent group grew out of supporters 
of the former President Peron 's politics and 
social reforms. The group's objective was for 
Peronist politics to prevail. Like a typical left-
ist guerrilla group in Latin America, it would 
use violent and illegal measures to prove its 
point, for example, kidnappings, protests which 
ended in violence, etc. The second responsi-
bility that General Videla undertook was to try 
to salvage Argentina's economy from virtual 
destruction. (For further information regard-
ing Argentina's economic struggles see Arthur 
Comstock's essay in this volume.) 
With Juan Peron dead, the Peronist guer-
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rilla groups started to push for political power. 
Eventually violent occurrences became so fre-
quent that the country was facing a full scale 
guerrilla war. The guerrillas were kidnapping 
prominent government officials, setting off 
bombs, and even assassinating figures within 
the army and other institutions. Soon the 
armed forces intervened and answered the 
guerrillas' actions with violence, torture and 
death. The military reacted to the guerrillas' 
violence by subjecting Argentina to extreme 
repression. The military began to stage its own 
violent outbursts without any forewarning. In 
addition, it began taking prisoners who soon 
came to be called the "disappeared." The num-
ber of people that disappeared grew rapidly. The 
military would use these hostages as a way to 
deter guerrillas from any further violent acts 
and often would even execute them. (Rock, p. 
363) With the country almost under a state of 
siege, the military took the responsibility of 
stopping the violent outbursts and restoring 
order. The only problem was that it didn't stop 
the bloodshed. Instead of stopping the guerril-
las' violence by reacting with its own violence, 
the military's plan escalated into a bloody bat-
tle which would be named "the Dirty War." 
All of this, coupled with the economic 
decay of the country, led to the extreme cir-
cumstances of tension and confusion that so 
often precede unusual solutions. As in the case 
of many Latin American countries, Argentina's 
"solution" was the 1976 coup d'etat. 
In order to ensure success, the military 
regime began "eliminating" members of soci-
ety who would threaten its prosperity through 
forced disappearances, torture , and death. 
Despite this reign of terror, the country's situ-
ation did not improve. The military regime's 
subsequent attempt at economic reforms suc-
ceeded for about four years, bringing inflation 
down to 88 percent per year in 1980: but by 
1981 Argentina would find itself once again in 
economic crisis. Inflation rose to over 100 per-
cent per year, and the country faced a recession. 
(Skidmore and Smith, p. 105) The military 
regime 's goal was to restructure society, but 
what it achieved was scarring it. 
In one final attempt at dignity, the military 
regime, which was now led by General Leopoldo 
Galtieri, decided to try to boost national pride 
and consequently gain national support through 
an event which would end up costing the regime 
its power. The event was what is now known as 
the Falklands/Malvinas War. These islands lie 
off the coast of Argentina, but are still controlled 
and populated by the British. Argentina invad-
ed the islands on April2, 1982, in what promised 
to be a small dispute with a simple ending. 
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Britain, 
had other ideas, however. She quickly dis-
patched troops to the small islands and the dis-
pute became an international incident. In the 
end Britain triumphed, and her victory cost the 
Argentine military its political power. After the 
Falklands/Malvinas War the Argentine economy 
continued to deteriorate. This in turn led to the 
end of the military rule and the beginning of a 
transition to democracy. 
The Democratic Transition: a 
Political Perspective 
In December of 1983 Raul Alfonsfn of the 
UCR party (Union Cfvica Radical) succeeded the 
last of the military presidents, General Reynaldo 
Bignone, and became the first civilian democ-
ratically elected president of Argentina since the 
coup of 1976. Alfonsfn had two major goals for 
his government and he accomplished one. His 
first goal was the consolidation of democracy. 
This he achieved. His second was economic 
recovery. This he did not achieve. In order to 
begin the reconciliation of Argentina's society, 
Alfonsfn set up an investigation of human rights 
violations. This resulted in the Nunca Mds 
(Never Again) report which documented the 
violations. This report, along with the suc-
cessful and peaceful transition to democracy, 
helped him to accomplish his first objective. 
His second objective, economic reform, would 
be attained by his successor, President Menem. 
The Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, 
won the next democratic election for President 
in May 1989. He began revitalizing the econo-
my by privatizing such companies as the nation-
al telephone company, ENTEL, and the nation-
al airlines, Aerolineas Argentinas. (Skidmore & 
Smith, p. 110) He followed up Alfonsfn's failed 
attempt at changing the currency to the austral 
by instituting the new peso as the form of cur-
rency. Finally, he tied the peso to the US dollar, 
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making the exchange rate between the two coun-
tries ' currencies even. Inflation subsequently 
declined, and Argentina's inflation rate has been 
relatively stable through the present. 
The Military Government and 
Human Rights 
In 1976 Argentina's new military govern-
ment faced considerable opposition. In order 
to cope with the various threats, the junta used 
its military to perpetuate gross human rights 
violations which included torture, death and 
"detained-disappearance." This last form of 
repression, detained-disappearance, was a tac-
tic not uncommon to other Latin American mil-
itary regimes. The controlling body would 
arrest a person for questioning, for example, and 
he or she would never return. Evidence of death 
was never found, so the person was not consid-
ered executed, though that was the likely fate. 
Instead, because the last known status was 
arrest, the person was considered "detained," 
but at the same time "disappeared." In 1976 
alone, the number of those considered detained-
disappeared rose to over 4,000. (Skaar, p. 49) 
By using these repressive tactics, the military 
could instill fear in society while eliminating 
opponents of the government at the same time. 
(Skaar, p. 49) The details of the human rights 
violations are documented in the Nunca Mds 
report. The report also contains detailed testi-
monies about torture and disappearance. 
Though arrests may have seemed random, 
not just anyone was taken by the military, at 
least not at first. The coming of the military 
dictatorship meant the systematic disappear-
ance of the opposition: in this case the guerril-
las. According to David Rock, 
Thousands vanished into prisons and 
police torture chambers. During the 
previous six years (1970-1976) the 
guerrillas ' victims had numbered at 
most two or three hundred; the price 
now exacted in retaliation, mostly 
through "disappearances," was at least 
10,000. The repression quite deliber-
ately, it seemed, was arbitrary, unco-
ordinated, and indiscriminate, which 
intensified its powers of intimidation. 
(Rock, pp. 367 -68) 
The military's use of intimidation spread to peo-
ple who merely knew or were associated with 
the opposition. Girlfriends, boyfriends, wives, 
husbands, friends , and relatives of the suspect-
ed opposition were taken, questioned and tor-
tured. Depending on the source, the number 
of disappearances ranges anywhere from 10,000 
(Rock, p. 368) to 30,000 (according to the 
human rights group las Madres de la Plaza de 
Mayo). The problem with estimating a precise 
number is that in many cases there were no 
bodies found. The military government enact-
ed a concerted effort to cover up the disposal of 
the bodies. For example, bodies would be flown 
out and dumped into the ocean, where they 
would certainly never be found. 
There is another group of victims that, to 
this author, symbolizes the horror of the 
Argentine dictatorship. This group is the chil-
dren, and their disappearance is a phenomenon 
unique to Argentina. Children were taken 
because of their parents' political and ideolog-
ical ties. There were two such groups of "dis-
appeared children." One group was the off-
spring of detained women who were pregnant. 
Pregnant women were taken and tortured just 
as the military would take and torture anyone 
in "normal" condition. Often, their babies were 
born while the mothers were incarcerated. 
According to the Nunca Mas report, "Many 
pregnant women were kidnapped ... and during 
their captivity they suffered every type of 
ridicule .... " (Nunca Mas report, p. 317) There 
is also considerable evidence that members of 
the military sometimes took the babies and 
raised them as their own children. 
Other children were taken because they 
happened to be with their parents who were 
being arrested. These children were incarcer-
ated and treated badly, like their parents. Some 
of them were also adopted by military families . 
Finally, there were children who were too old 
to be considered young children incapable of 
free thought and ideas, yet not old enough to 
be considered adults. As stated in the Nunca 
Mas report, "Almost 250 girls and boys that 
were between the ages of 13 and 18 years old 
disappeared .... They were kidnapped in their 
homes , in the public street or upon leaving 
school ... There were many adolescents who dis-
appeared as a consequence of the repression 
exercised against their parents." (translated into 
English, Nunca Mas report, p. 324) Some of 
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these children were eventually returned, but are 
scarred emotionally for life. Some are still 
being looked for and may never be found. 
The Formation of Human Rights 
Organizations 
The public, especially those closely 
involved with or related to those who had dis-
appeared , did not ignore the gross human 
rights violations. Instead, many in Argentine 
society bravely confronted the opposition. 
It is hard to imagine that a government 
would have the capability of invading and violat-
ing an entire nation's rights. What is even hard-
er to imagine is how those who were left behind 
by husbands, wives, fathers, mothers, and chil-
dren were able to cope. The fact is, the victims 
didn't cope; they fought back, and they did it by 
forming political human rights organizations. 
Ten major organizations were formed dur-
ing the military regime to combat and protest 
the government's gross human rights viola-
tions. These were educational and social groups 
that concentrated on specific themes, includ-
ing detained and disappeared persons, persons 
who were forced into exile, and basic human 
rights violations. I will focus here on two 
groups in particular that received the most 
attention both nationally and abroad. They were 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. These 
groups, like others, were formed in protest of 
the detained and disappeared with the inten-
tions of discovering the whereabouts of their 
children and grandchildren. Their tactics and 
the attention they received made them unique. 
These groups were able to form under for-
midable conditions. The Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo began protesting on Thursday, April 
30, 1977. They began as a group of fourteen 
women who met every Thursday in the Plaza de 
Mayo to protest the disappearance of their chil-
dren. (This not only included young children, 
but grown adults as well.) The Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo found that every Thursday their 
group grew and grew. Finally on August 22, 
1979, the group was officially formed. During 
the dictatorship, members of the group faced 
considerable opposition and some were even 
arrested themselves. Eventually, the group 
grew to include 2,500 members and had mem-
bers throughout Argentina, not just Buenos 
Aires. (Frtihling, Alberti, and Portales, pp. 46-
48) The group received international attention 
and has been featured in documentaries about 
human rights abuses. 
The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
formed in 1977 to combat the same problem, 
but it did so in a different way. The group 
protested the disappearance of their grandchil-
dren who were either taken with their parents 
at the time of the coup or were born in captiv-
ity. The group differed from the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo because it primarily concentrat-
ed on looking for the children rather than sim-
ply protesting visibly, though both groups did 
participate in both activities. According to Hugo 
Frtihling, the group's main objective was "to 
obtain the identification of each one of the chil-
dren and total or partial restitution ... to their 
true families. Up to the moment [1988] they 
have found 45 children out of a total of 208 reg-
istered as disappeared." (Translated into 
English, Frtihling, Alberti, and Portales, p. 21) 
The group remains active today looking for the 
children and trying to match them with their 
respective families. These groups and others 
played significant roles through active protest 
during the military regime. Later, they would 
evolve to become important voices that would 
be heard by the democratic government during 
its transition period. President Alfonsfn catered 
to these groups during his campaign by promis-
ing that he would not adhere to a law of gener-
al amnesty. The groups succeeded by forcing 
the recognition of the human rights violations 
committed during the military regime. One 
could say that they were even essential in the 
process of reconciling Argentine society. 
Human Rights and the Transition to 
Democracy 
As briefly mentioned earlier in this paper, 
in 1983 the military's reign of terror ended and 
the era of democracy began with President 
Alfonsfn. How the newly elected president han-
dled the situation regarding human rights vio-
lations is significant for many reasons. One of 
President Alfonsfn's campaign promises was 
retribution for human rights violators. During 
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his presidential campaign this was a key issue, 
because the military junta had passed a law in 
September of 1983 which granted amnesty to 
anyone who had committed crimes during the 
military regime against leftist guerrilla forces. 
(Powell) Alfonsfn vowed to overturn this law 
under civilian rule, and he did exactly that once 
in office. 
He began the healing process by appoint-
ing a commission (the National Commission on 
the Disappearance of Persons) which investi-
gated and detailed the execution or disappear-
ance of 8,906 people in Argentina. (Skidmore 
and Smith, p. 108) This commission published 
the Nunca Mas report which other Latin 
American countries, including Chile, would use 
as a model when they faced the process of 
democratization in the future. The report 
includes testimonies of victims and their 
respective families. Though the report is thor-
ough, some believe the total number of people 
represented is underestimated. The commis-
sion explains its objectives and the process it 
went through in a long and moving prologue, 
part of which reads as follows: 
With sadness, with pain we have com-
pleted the mission that was entrusted 
to us in the moment of the 
Constitutional President of the 
Republic. This job was very hard, 
because we had to repair a difficult puz-
zle, many years after the facts occurred, 
when they have deliberately erased all 
of the faces, they have burned all of the 
documents and they have demolished 
the buildings ... The most terrible 
drama that the nation suffered in all its 
history was during the period that the 
military dictatorship lasted through, 
initiated in March 1976, and it will 
serve to make us understand that only 
democracy is capable of preserving a 
population ... that only democracy can 
maintain and save the sacred and 
essential rights of the human creature. 
Only this way will we be able to be sure 
that NEVER AGAIN in our country will 
the famous events .... be repeated in the 
civilized world. (Translated into 
English, from the Prologue of the 
Nunca Mas report, pp. 10-11) 
The Nunca Mas report was an essential first step 
in the process of reconciling Argentina. Alfonsfn 
did not stop, however, with the official investiga-
tion made public through the document. 
The Argentine people, led by the ambitious 
human rights groups, were not satisfied by the 
Nunca Mas report alone. They wanted the abo-
lition of amnesty for the armed forces and that 
included anyone who committed human rights 
violations. Alfonsfn, under pressure by these 
groups, made the path-breaking decision to lift 
the amnesty law installed by the military junta, 
and forced major military leaders to stand 
accused of violating human rights before a civil-
ian court. The government's judicial branch 
charged and tried nine of the most important 
and powerful generals of the military regime. 
The human rights trials were a new occur-
rence in the way Latin American countries with 
histories of human rights violations handled the 
process of democratization. In 1985 the whole 
world watched as Argentina's judicial system 
tried the very men who once ruled the country. 
They were former presidents and former army 
generals Jorge Videla, Viola and Leopolda 
Galtieri; former navy chiefs Massera, Armando 
Lambruschini and Jorge Anaya, and former air 
force leaders Orlando Agosti, Omar Graffigna 
and Basilio Lami Dozo. (Beard, "Carter Human 
Rights Aide ... " p. C5) An impressive 835 wit-
nesses recounted tales of torture chambers and 
murders ordered by the leaders. Throughout 
the trials, the leaders and their defenders main-
tained that during the period of the military dic-
tatorship the country had been in a state of war, 
a national emergency. They even tried to argue 
that their actions were heroic and that they 
saved the country from a "communist state." 
(Beard, "Argentine 'Dirty War' Trial Ends," p. 
C 11) These arguments may have saved some of 
the leaders from a lifetime behind bars. Though 
there were different sentences ranging from life 
imprisonment to acquittals, the convictions 
symbolized a sense of justice and a readiness for 
Argentine society to put its past behind it. 
(Reuters, "Argentine Activists ... " p. 11) 
The human rights trials represented an 
effort by the Alfonsfn government to reconcile 
its broken nation by forcing an elite few to take 
responsibility for their actions during the dic-
tatorship, without the expense, hassle, and fur-
ther heartbreak of trying every military officer 
guilty of human rights violations. The idea was 
a potent one. It is impossible to expect a nation 
torn apart by the death of as many as thirty 
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thousand people to embrace democracy with-
out first reconciling with its recent past. The 
compromise of prosecuting the generals was 
one that allowed the symbolic punishment of 
the human rights violators to take place. The 
generals represented the repression; and even 
though not every soldier was tried and pun-
ished, through the trials of the generals a form 
of reconciliation was achieved. For these rea-
sons, President Alfonsfn's human rights trials 
were a unique and bold approach to beginning 
his country's transition to democracy. 
The Breakdown of Justice 
The trials resulted in the sentencing of a 
total of nine of Argentina's top rulers and armed 
forces leaders. Unfortunately, this sentencing 
was the only justice that Argentine society 
would see. Everything that happened after-
wards served to only frustrate human rights 
activists and organizations. 
It all started when PresidentAlfonsfn start-
ed to rescind some of his original constraints 
on the amnesty laws. Because the military 
reacted with hostility to the sentencing of its 
commanders, Alfonsfn was forced by protests of 
human rights organizations to retract his 
promise of a ban on general amnesty. He did so 
by introducing a law in 1987 that erased charges 
against military officers and junior military offi-
cers. (Atwood, 1987) Alfonsfn's introduction of 
the new law that would, in essence, support 
amnesty in some cases angered human rights 
organizations. He never intended to dismantle 
any of his previous actions by pardoning sen-
tenced generals, however. In this sense, he was 
trying to help the reconciliation process by 
appeasing the human rights groups with trials, 
but without frustrating the military by dragging 
every one of its officers through the court sys-
tem. However, the human rights organizations 
thought everyone should be punished while the 
military complained it had been merely acting 
in the best interest of the country. 
Alfonsfn had ventured into unchartered 
territory by charging and indicting generals for 
human rights violations. Though some activists 
say he did not go far enough, he had gone fur-
ther than anyone before him had had the 
courage to go. With his policies the Argentine 
people may have found that they could put the 
past behind them and accept the punishment 
of a few top officials as punishment for all who 
were guilty. This theory, of course, can never 
be tested because in 1989, Peronist President 
Carlos Menem took office, and the reconcilia-
tion process came to a standstill. 
The Reconciliation and Its Demise 
In an attempt to "heal lingering wounds" 
Menem effectively unraveled Raul Alfonsfn's 
human rights policy by issuing pardons for the 
convicted military generals. (Smith, p. 1) 
Menem's actions, however, suspiciously 
appeared to be more of an endeavor to stimu-
late the reconciliation of the military and the 
government rather than that of the military and 
Argentine society as a whole. This action 
proved so controversial that the human rights 
organizations declared December 30, 1990, as 
a day of "mourning" to show opposition against 
the pardon. (Bonasegna, p. 4) But Menem 
stood by his action claiming that it was "a nec-
essary step toward national reconciliation." 
(Malamud-Goti, p. 517) Human rights activists 
as well as political analysts disagreed, seeing the 
action as a setback in the democratic transition. 
Menem garnered much criticism with his 
seemingly anti-human rights actions, and con-
sequently he received many resignations under 
his administration. For example, Mrs. 
Fernandez Meijide, a human rights activist, 
reacted to Men em's second attempt at "healing 
the nation" by stating: "Once again, civilian 
power ... gives in to military power. This pardon 
has little to do with pacifying the country and 
a lot to do with an attempt to prevent military 
pressure in the future." (Bonasegna, p. 4) 
Menem's actions only prolonged the painful 
reconciliation process. 
Individual Attempts to Heal a Nation 
If the Argentines learned one thing dur-
ing their years under oppressive military rule, 
it was that through group effort and determi-
nation many dreams can become real. The 
democratic government may have failed the 
human rights activists' and organizations' 
expectations, but that did not stop the groups 
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from progressing towards reconciliation. 
Human rights groups continued to protest 
every step backwards that the government took 
in its wishy-washy stance on amnesty. The 
groups also contributed on a smaller scale by 
searching for missing children, trying to iden-
tify bodies, and, perhaps the most important, 
never losing the hope of finding out the truth 
and achieving justice. 
There have been rare instances of 
reunions of a child with either the child's grand-
parents (because the parents were detained-dis-
appeared persons) or the natural parents. In 
1983 one such reunion took place. In this inci-
dent, a poor family found an abandoned infant 
during the years of the "Dirty War" and moved 
away from Buenos Aires to escape the violence. 
They took the child with them and adopted and 
raised the baby as their own. The child's name 
is Tamara Ana Maria Arce. Her adoptive par-
ents told her what they thought to be the truth, 
that she had been abandoned by her natural 
mother, but what they did not know was that 
her mother was one of the detained-disappeared 
persons. Unlike many of the detained-disap-
peared, however, she had been released. 
Following her release she spent two years 
searching for her daughter. (Diehl, p. A1) 
Because of the organization and resources of 
groups like the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 
Rose Mary Riveros reunited with her daughter 
in Lima, Peru, in September of 1983. Sadly, 
however, stories like this one are unusual. More 
often than not, the children who are being des-
perately sought out by relatives are never found. 
Another facet of the healing process is 
finding the remains of the detained-disap-
peared. Berta Schuberoff is the mother of 
Marcelo Gelman, who disappeared during the 
"Dirty War." The mothers realize now that their 
missing sons or daughters are in fact dead. 
Many of their bodies will never be found 
because of the extreme measures taken by t'1e 
military to hide them. Berta Schuberoff is dif-
ferent, however, for in 1989, her son's body was 
found and identified. Upon finally learning the 
true fate of her son she reacted by saying, 
"When they gave me back his remains ... , I cried 
a lot, which I had not been able to do before .... 
After 13 years I was at last able to mourn." 
(Ford, p. 6) Because of the work of the 
Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, many 
families have been able to finally lay their loved 
ones to rest. This knowledge has tremendous 
healing effects. The Argentine people may have 
been robbed of their justice, but some of them 
are helping uncover the truth. Without both 
reconciliation is unlikely. 
Truth Revealed 
At the time of my writing this article, some 
startling new evidence about exactly what hap-
pened during the "Dirty War" was uncovered. In 
late March 1995, former navy Lieutenant 
Commander Adolfo Francisco Sclingo admitted 
in his book about the "Dirty War" that people 
were thrown to their deaths from airplanes as a 
form of execution. This practice had often been 
rumored to be true, but the written acknowl-
edgement of it by someone who witnessed and 
even participated in the events is unprecedent-
ed. According to Sclingo the victims were "told 
they were being transferred from the notorious 
detention center in the Navy School of 
Mechanics in Buenos Aires [and] were so weak 
from torture and confinement that they had to 
be helped onto the planes, where they were 
heavily sedated." (Honore, p. 14A) In addition, 
Sclingo admitted having taken part in pushing 
prisoners to their deaths on two flights. 
The publicity of this recent admission has 
sparked some controversy; but at the same time, 
the general attitude of the Argentine people has 
not changed. In other words, people still want 
to forget about the "Dirty War." The people who 
have been stirred by this news are the Catholic 
Church and the human rights activists. 
The Catholic Church in particular has been 
involved because of Sclingo's implication that 
the Church approved of this form of execution 
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as a humane act. Accordingly, the Church has 
opened an investigation into the violations of 
the "Dirty War." According to a recent article, 
"Argentina's Roman Catholic Bishops pledged 
yesterday [April29, 1995] to come clean on the 
church's role in the "dirty war" of the 1970s ... 
Argentina's bishops responded with a March 8 
statement condemning chaplains who might 
have supported the torturers, but said they 
themselves had always tried to save people." 
(Reuters, "Argentine Bishops ... ," p. 25) The 
Church's continued investigation into human 
rights violations is something that is of partic-
ular interest to human rights activists. 
Conclusion 
Reconciliation had a chance in Argentina. 
Most other Latin American countries did not 
even try to do what Alfonsfn did to restore 
democracy and heal wounds simultaneously. It 
is a difficult task, but his handling of it won him 
international recognition and acclaim. Menem 
did succeed him in a peaceful transition of 
democratic power. He also succeeded in bring-
ing about enormous economic reform to the 
country. But he failed in the eyes of human 
rights organizations and the people of Argentina 
who continue to suffer to this day because jus-
tice was not served. Their sons and daughters, 
husbands and wives, mothers and fathers dis-
appeared, were tortured, and were murdered; 
and most of the people responsible have never 
been brought to justice. The country's healing 
process was stunted and it has never had the 
chance to learn the truth, mourn its losses and 
begin again. As the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo chant, "We will not forgive and we will not 
forget. " Without retribution, Argentina's people 
may never forget the "Dirty War." 
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